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THE SHRINKING CONSTITUTION OF 
SETTLEMENT 
David E. Pozen* 
ABSTRACT 
Professor Sanford Levinson has famously distinguished between the 
“Constitution of Settlement” and the “Constitution of Conversation.” The former 
comprises those aspects of the Constitution that are clear, well-established, and 
resistant to creative interpretation. The latter comprises those aspects that are 
subject to ongoing litigation and debate. Although Americans tend to fixate on the 
Constitution of Conversation, Levinson argues that much of what ails our 
republic is attributable, at least in part, to the grossly undemocratic and “decidedly 
nonadaptive” Constitution of Settlement. 
This Article, prepared for a symposium on Levinson’s coauthored book 
Democracy and Dysfunction, explains that the Constitution of Settlement is in 
fact becoming unsettled, as growing levels of political frustration and polarization 
have roused a growing number of actors to seek to challenge or circumvent 
various pieces of it. Fundamental reform is now on the table. The Constitution of 
Conversation, meanwhile, is becoming ever less conversational. As these 
developments reflect, the distinction between Levinson’s two constitutions is 
significantly more complicated—and fluid—than his binary implies. Ironically, 
Levinson is not just a leading critic of the Constitution of Settlement but also an 
active participant in its maintenance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the afterword to the 2011 edition of Constitutional Faith and in the 
2012 book Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance, 
Professor Sanford Levinson introduced a distinction between the 
“Constitution of Settlement” and the “Constitution of Conversation.”1 The 
Constitution of Settlement comprises those aspects of the Constitution that 
are clear, well-established, and resistant to creative interpretation: for 
example, the two-senators-per-state rule.2 Because they are seen as 
straightforward, these provisions tend to be taken for granted. The 
Constitution of Conversation, in contrast, comprises those aspects of the 
Constitution that are sufficiently open textured as to invite ongoing litigation 
and debate: for example, the Equal Protection Clause.3 The distinction 
between the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of 
Conversation has been embraced by scholars from diverse disciplines4 and 
features prominently in the celebrated constitutional law casebook that 
Levinson coauthors.5 
 
 1.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 246–54 (2d ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH]; SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: 
AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 19–28 (2012) 
[hereinafter LEVINSON, FRAMED]. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed 
of two Senators from each State . . . .”). 
 3.  Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 639, 652 (2018) (“Professor Sanford 
Levinson, in a pathbreaking work on America’s constitutions, coined the phrases 
‘Constitution of Settlement’ and ‘Constitution of Conversation’ . . . .”); Andrew Arato, 
Book Review, 20 CONSTELLATIONS 503, 503 (2013) (reviewing LEVINSON, FRAMED, 
supra note 1) (describing the distinction as “fruitful” and “the most positive feature” of 
Framed); John E. Finn, Book Review, 13 PERSP. ON POL. 162, 163 (2015) (reviewing 
LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1) (commending Levinson’s call “to set aside our 
fascination with the ‘Constitution of Conversation’ . . . in favor of thinking about the 
‘Constitution of Settlement’”); Robert F. Williams, Unsettling the Settled: Challenging 
the Great and Not-so-Great Compromises in the Constitution, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1151 
(2013) (book review) (“Levinson has . . . provided a fascinating review of the theory 
behind and the actual operation of our Constitution of Settlement.”). 
 5.  The distinction between the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of 
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From the moment he put forward this now “famous[]” distinction,6 
Levinson has been an indefatigable critic of the Constitution of Settlement. 
In scores of articles, blog posts, and books, he has argued that its structural 
pillars—from the Electoral College to congressional bicameralism to the 
apportionment of senators to the Article V amendment rules to the 
presidential veto to the requirement that the president be a “natural born 
Citizen”—violate basic principles of democracy and breed political 
dysfunction.7 Lawyers like to obsess over relatively indeterminate phrases 
such as cruel and unusual or due process. But it is the more prosaic terms of 
the Constitution of Settlement that demand our attention, in Levinson’s 
telling, as these “static, decidedly nonadaptive aspects”8 of the constitutional 
order are destroying any hope of realizing “the magnificent vision”9 that the 
Framers set forth in the Preamble. To vindicate the Preamble’s promise 
today, Levinson asserts that nothing less than a second constitutional 
convention is needed, so that Americans can rewrite the canonical document 
and resolve its foundational flaws.10 
Levinson’s letters in Democracy and Dysfunction repeatedly return to 
this theme, with a Trumpian twist. The parts of the Constitution of 
Settlement that make lawmaking so difficult, Levinson suggests, have 
created a perpetual “crisis of governance,” which in turn creates a hospitable 
political environment for a populist demagogue such as Donald Trump.11 
And as we all know, the Electoral College allowed President Trump to 
ascend to the White House even though Hillary Clinton received millions 
more votes.12 
 
Conversation is the subject of the first “note” in the current edition of the casebook. See 
PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. 
SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 
23–25 (7th ed. 2018). 
 6.  Jack Balkin, Dysfunctional Constitution or Regime Change?, BALKINIZATION 
(Jan. 30, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/01/dysfunctional-constitution-or-
regime.html [https://perma.cc/CEJ5-UBBZ]. 
 7.  See, e.g., LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 119 (Natural Born Citizen 
Clause); id. at 133–61 (bicameralism); id. at 148–51 (Senate apportionment); id. at 164–
72 (presidential veto); id. at 178–90 (Electoral College); id. at 331–45 (Article V). 
 8.  LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 249. 
 9.  Id. at 251.  
 10.  See, e.g., id. at 254; LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 391. 
 11.  SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 14 
(2019); see also id. at 12–14 (reviewing “some of the primary fault lines or hidden dangers 
in the Constitution of Settlement”). 
 12.  Id. at 3, 64, 175. 
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Responding to Levinson, Professor Jack Balkin contends that certain 
features of the Constitution of Settlement limit President Trump’s ability to 
do lasting damage to the republic, for which we should be grateful.13 Balkin 
further contends that the most serious defects in our constitutional system 
can be remedied through subconstitutional measures, such as a new federal 
statute allowing multimember districts for the House of Representatives or 
a new interstate compact guaranteeing the presidency to the candidate who 
receives the most votes nationwide.14 Holding a constitutional convention, 
accordingly, would be unnecessary and unwise.15 
Balkin’s arguments about the possibilities for constitutional reform 
under conditions of functional unamendability gesture toward, and seek to 
advance, a phenomenon I wish to highlight: The Constitution of Settlement 
is becoming unsettled.16 Not in the books, but in action. That is to say, many 
different features of Levinson’s Constitution of Settlement no longer look as 
“static” as they used to look, as growing levels of political frustration and 
polarization have roused a growing number of actors to seek to challenge or 
circumvent them without necessarily pursuing a constitutional amendment. 
An appreciation of this phenomenon can help us to assess both Levinson’s 
thesis and the state of contemporary constitutional politics. 
II. UNSETTLING DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Indirect Examples 
Some of the ways in which the Constitution of Settlement is becoming 
unsettled are indirect. In these areas, politicians, activists, and academics 
have not, for the most part, contested the traditional understanding of the 
relevant constitutional limits; April Fools’ jokes aside, they have not, say, 
advanced an alternative interpretation of Article I, Section 3’s directive that  
 
 
 13.  Id. at 70–75, 99. 
 14.  Id. at 22–23, 199–203. 
 15.  Id. at 199–203. 
 16.  The so-called New Deal Settlement regarding the scope and distribution of the 
federal government’s power is also becoming unsettled, at least around the edges, but 
that is another story. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—
Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(2017); Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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the Senate “shall be composed of two Senators from each State.”17 Rather, 
they have engaged in behaviors that have the purpose or effect of changing 
the practical implications of those limits. For example: 
 As of this writing, sixteen jurisdictions have signed on to the 
National Popular Vote Compact, which would effectively neuter 
the Electoral College and nationalize presidential elections if states 
controlling a majority of electors were to join it.18 Other ideas for 
state-level Electoral College reform seem to be gaining traction as 
well.19 
 Proposals to grant statehood to the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico through federal legislation have moved from the margins to 
the mainstream of the Democratic Party.20 Meanwhile, a proposal 
 
 17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Fittingly enough, a brilliant April Fools’ Day parody 
has Levinson’s foil, Balkin, advancing the off-the-wall claim that “the phrase ‘two 
Senators from each state’ is a metonym for ‘a number of Senators that is proportionate 
to the body that these Senators represent.’” Lawrence Solum, Balkin on the Senate, 
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 1, 2010), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/ 
2010/04/balkin-on-framework-originalism-and-the-senate.html [https://perma.cc/P45N-
U2DM]. 
 18.  See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular 
Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation 
[https://perma.cc/HRN9-RZB7]; see also Jack Torry, Presidential Election: Voters May 
Get to Change Way Ohio Awards Electoral Votes, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/ohio-voters-may 
-get-chance-way-state-awards-electoral-votes/gbJ7FaaMC1h9QC170MDfAO [https:// 
perma.cc/TYJ2-Y75M] (noting that abolishing the Electoral College “has become one 
of the rallying cries of at least seven Democratic presidential candidates”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Want to Fix Presidential Elections? Here’s the 
Quickest Way., POLITICO MAG. (May 4, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story 
/2019/05/04/electoral-college-reform-2020-226792 [https://perma.cc/9VVQ-ERBA] 
(reviewing reform proposals currently “on the table” and recommending “an achievable, 
short-term solution” in which as few as five swing states “embrace, via ballot initiatives 
or legislation, electoral systems that reward only candidates who win a majority of the 
vote”). 
 20.  See Marc Caputo, Puerto Rico Emerges as 2020 Campaign Hotspot, POLITICO 
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/27/puerto-rico-2020-1194114 
[https://perma.cc/97LS-DBCV]; Osita Nwanevu, Democrats Push to Make Washington, 
D.C., the Fifty-First State, NEW YORKER (Mar. 10, 2019), https:// 
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/democrats-push-to-make-washington-dc-the-
fifty-first-state [https://perma.cc/MK4P-Y7FE]; see also Katie Windham, The Public 
Supports Statehood for D.C. and Puerto Rico, DATA FOR PROGRESS (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2019/2/28/the-public-supports-statehood-for-dc-
and-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/82LL-VS8X] (reporting January 2019 survey results 
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to break up California into three states nearly made it onto the 
ballot in November 2018.21 These and similar reforms would bring 
the Senate closer, albeit only modestly, to the one-person-one-vote 
norm without disturbing the two-senators-per-state rule. 
 For a variety of reasons,22 recent presidents have wielded the veto—
a tool Levinson describes as “very anti-democratic”23—significantly 
less often than their twentieth-century predecessors: fewer than two 
times per year since the turn of the millennium.24 (Perhaps 
unhappily from Levinson’s perspective, recent presidents have also 
been relying less on their enumerated power “to make Treaties,”25 
subject to two-thirds Senate approval, and relying much more on 
congressional–executive agreements, sole executive agreements, 
and legally nonbinding political agreements.26) 
 Since the 1970s, congressional leaders have increasingly resorted to 
“unorthodox lawmaking,” bypassing committees and conferences 
and making greater use of omnibus vehicles and informal 
bargaining practices.27 These deviations from the textbook 
 
finding that a supermajority of Democratic voters and a “clear” majority of all 
Americans support D.C. and especially Puerto Rican statehood).  
 21.  See California Proposition 9, Three States Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_9,_Three_States_Initiative_(2018) [https 
://perma.cc/VRV2-RVEP]. 
 22.  See Alan Greenblatt, 5 Reasons Vetoes Have Gone Out of Style, NPR (May 9, 
2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/02/22/172698717/five-reasons-
vetoes-have-gone-out-of-style [https://perma.cc/M5W5-M9Y3]. 
 23.  Sanford Levinson, Against the Veto., NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 8, 2006), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/64983/against-the-veto [https://perma.cc/67RY-F2KJ]. 
 24.  See Leah Libresco, Comparing Obama’s Veto Rate to Other Recent Presidents’, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 23, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/comparing-
obamas-veto-rate-to-other-recent-presidents [https://perma.cc/6JD8-PEJS]; Gerhard 
Peters & John T. Woolley, Presidential Vetoes, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/presidential-vetoes [https://perma.cc/ 
YZZ8-NUEC] (last updated Dec. 31, 2019). 
 25.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 26.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over 
International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1212–23 (2018) (estimating that 
“approximately 94% of [legally binding] U.S. international agreements made in the last 
several decades . . . are not treaties” and explaining that legally nonbinding political 
commitments have proliferated as well). 
 27.  See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2016). 
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legislative process have allowed Congress to remain reasonably 
productive in the face of rising partisan rancor,28 mitigating the 
efficiency costs of Article I, Section 7’s bicameralism and 
presentment requirements.29 
 While the Supreme Court still refuses to declare partisan 
gerrymandering unconstitutional30 and the Elections Clause still 
gives “the Legislature” of “each State” broad authority over 
redistricting,31 the Court ruled in 2015 that voters may, by ballot 
initiative, force their state to adopt an independent commission for 
the drawing of all districts.32 Assisted by this ruling, grassroots 
activists have made significant strides since 2015 in promoting anti-
gerrymandering reforms.33 
 
 28.  Definitions of legislative productivity are debatable, of course, but at least if 
measured (crudely) by raw numbers of bills and resolutions introduced and passed each 
session, congressional productivity has remained fairly stable in recent decades. See 
Drew DeSilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the 115th Congress: More Laws than Before, 
but Not More Substance, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019), https:// 
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress 
[https://perma.cc/E8B9-DCSX]; Legislative Productivity in Congress and Workload,  
BROOKINGS  INST.,  https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Chpt-6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KW47-DAUR]; Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/9BUH-L2CL]. 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3; cf. Sanford Levinson, Compromise and 
Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821, 828 (2011) (observing that “American 
bicameralism, unlike many bicameral systems around the world, gives each house a 
death-lock over any legislation passed by the other” and asserting that “[w]e pay the 
costs [of this arrangement] every day”). 
 30.  For the most recent, and seemingly definitive, refusal, see Rucho v. Common 
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering 
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”). 
 31.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”). 
 32.  Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2671–77 (2015). 
 33.  See Nancy Martorano Miller, Keith E. Hamm, Maria Aroca & Ronald D. 
Hedlund, An Alternative Route to Voting Reform: The Right to Vote, Voter Registration, 
Redistricting and U.S. State Constitutions, 49 PUBLIUS 465, 467 (2019) (reviewing “recent 
efforts by voting and election reformers to utilize state constitutions in their efforts to 
challenge restrictive voting laws as well as partisan gerrymandering”); Michael Wines, 
Drive Against Gerrymandering Finds New Life in Ballot Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES (July 23,  
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B. Direct Examples 
Other ways in which the Constitution of Settlement is becoming 
unsettled are somewhat more direct. In these areas, politicians, activists, and 
academics have not tried to find clever workarounds for disputed 
constitutional arrangements, so much as to alter the arrangements 
themselves through legal reinterpretation or political action. For example: 
 The Senate filibuster rules had seemed so entrenched for so long 
that both Levinson and Balkin characterized them in prior writings 
as part of the Constitution of Settlement.34 No more. Senate 
majorities eliminated the filibuster for all non–Supreme Court 
nominations in 2013 and for Supreme Court nominations in 2017.35 
The legislative filibuster may meet the same fate shortly.36 
 “Suddenly,” Professor Stephen Carter remarked in late 2018, 
“everybody wants to explore term limits for Supreme Court 
justices.”37 Carter may have put the point hyperbolically, but 
 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/us/gerrymandering-states.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HA9G-NKRV] (discussing a “remarkable” burst of anti-gerrymandering 
reform activity). 
 34.  LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 160; Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of 
Disco: Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1164 
(2014). As Levinson noted at the time, “[n]o one argues that the Constitution requires” 
the filibuster. LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 160. His decision to categorize the 
filibuster, nonetheless, as part of the Constitution of Settlement sits uneasily with his 
identification of that Constitution with “clear textual commands,” LEVINSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 1, at 249—a point to which I will return below. See 
infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 35.  See Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search 
for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97–110 (2017) (describing these developments 
and their political context). 
 36.  See Burgess Everett, Coming Soon: The Death of the Filibuster, POLITICO (Apr. 
3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/03/senate-republicans-filibuster-
1250082 [https://perma.cc/5FWM-Z87Y]; Paul Kane, With Little Fallout from Nuclear 
Option, Senate’s Legislative Filibuster Is in Jeopardy, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/with-little-fallout-from-nuclear-option-senate 
s-legislative-filibuster-is-in-jeopardy/2019/04/02/8d8bc7c4-554c-11e9-aa83-504f086bf5d6 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/G9FZ-59ZG]; Rebecca Shabad, Frank Thorp V & Ali 
Vitali, Elizabeth Warren Calls for Eliminating Senate Filibuster for Legislation, NBC 
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/elizabeth-warren-calls-
eliminating-senate-filibuster-legislation-n991301 [https://perma.cc/D3JW-3QQ8].  
 37.  Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court Needs Term Limits, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 8, 
2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-supreme-court- 
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prominent commentators and advocacy groups on the left and the 
right now tout an idea that used to be considered an academic pipe 
dream,38 as do ordinary Americans in surveys.39 A variety of other 
court-reform ideas are also being actively explored.40 Supporters of 
term limits, moreover, are coming to insist that they could be 
implemented through ordinary legislation, on the view that Article 
III’s Good Behavior Clause should not be read to require life tenure 
as an active-duty justice.41 
 Although still a fringe position, constitutional scholars have begun 
to suggest that the Natural Born Citizen Clause may have been  
implicitly “repealed” by the Fourteenth Amendment (which, as  
construed by the Supreme Court, places sharp limits on national-
 
term-limits-brett-kavanaugh-life-tenure-1009-story.html [https://perma.cc/NHE4-
XNDB]. 
 38.  See Marcia Coyle, Term Limits, 11 Justices, Balancing & More: Reshaping 
SCOTUS Is in Vogue, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 16, 2018), available at 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/term-limits-11-justices-balancing-053756585.html [https 
://perma.cc/V3YL-PRGS]; Melissa Heelan Stanzione, Kavanuagh Saga Amplifies Call 
for Supreme Court Term Limits, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 13, 2018), https://news. 
bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/kavanaugh-saga-amplifies-call-for-supreme-court-ter 
m-limits [https://perma.cc/PP3Q-BZK4]. Balkin and Levinson have long supported term 
limits for the justices. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Reforming the Supreme Court, 
BALKINIZATION (Feb. 13, 2009), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/02/reforming-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/YU2N-AG3M]. 
 39.  See UVA Ctr. for Pol., New Poll: Americans Strongly Support Term Limits for 
Judges,  SABATO’S  CRYSTAL  BALL  (July  19,  2018),  http://www.centerforpolitics.org/ 
crystalball/articles/new-poll-americans-strongly-support-term-limits-for-judges [https:// 
perma.cc/D4CK-37YB]; Lydia Wheeler, Majority of Americans Support Term Limits for 
Supreme  Court  Justices,  New  Poll  Finds,  HILL  (Nov.  1,  2018),  https://thehill.com/ 
regulation/court-battles/414264-majority-of-americans-support-term-limits-for-supreme 
-court-justices [https://perma.cc/8GKT-7QNS]. 
 40.  See, e.g., Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme 
Court, NBC NEWS (June 3, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-
election/inside-pete-buttigieg-s-plan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma. 
cc/H4L7-6YBD] (explaining that Democratic presidential candidates Pete Buttigieg and 
Beto O’Rourke have expressed interest in the “Balanced Court” plan proposed by 
Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman); Pema Levy, How Court-Packing Went 
from a Fringe Idea to a Serious Democratic Proposal, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/court-packing-2020 [https://perma.cc/ 
4NA2-TDET] (describing the possibility of “packing” the Court as “now a major theme 
of the Democratic primary and possibly the general election”). 
 41.  I myself have noted the plausibility of this view. See David E. Pozen, Hardball 
and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 951–52 (2019).  
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origin discrimination).42 More saliently, controversies over Senator 
John McCain’s and Senator Ted Cruz’s presidential eligibility 
alternately solidified and undermined support for the position that 
children of U.S. citizens born abroad are natural born citizens 
within the meaning of the Clause.43 
 In October 2018, President Trump announced he was preparing an 
executive order that would deny birthright citizenship to children 
born in the United States to parents unlawfully in the country,44 
notwithstanding the Department of Justice’s consistent stance that 
such a move would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause.45 President Trump appears to have abandoned 
this plan, at least for the time being, but his revisionist  
understanding of the Citizenship Clause may yet become 
Republican Party orthodoxy.46 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Paul A. Clark, Limiting the Presidency to Natural Born Citizens 
Violates Due Process, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1343, 1343–65 (2006); Elwood Earl 
Sanders, Jr., Could Arnold Schwarzenegger Run for President Now?, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. 
REV. 331, 332–55 (2005); Josh Blackman, Did the 14th Amendment (1868) Nullify the 
“Natural Born Citizen” Clause (1789)?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/03/24/did-the-14th-amendment-1868-nullify-the-nat 
ural-born-citizen-clause-1789 [https://perma.cc/ZWH2-FPEF]. 
 43.  See Christopher W. Schmidt & Matthew T. Bodie, The Natural-Born Citizen 
Clause, Popular Constitutionalism, and Ted Cruz’s Eligibility Question, 84 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. ARGUENDO 36, 42–46 (2016) (explaining that “what appeared to be a stable 
academic [and political] consensus took shape” during McCain’s presidential run 
“around the idea that those who are foreign born to U.S. citizen parents meet the 
requirements of the clause,” but that this apparent consensus began to fray when 
challenged by then-presidential candidate Donald Trump in 2015 and 2016). 
 44.  Jonathan Swan & Stef W. Kight, Exclusive: Trump Targeting Birthright 
Citizenship with Executive Order, AXIOS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-
birthright-citizenship-executive-order-0cf4285a-16c6-48f2-a933-bd71fd72ea82.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/8C64-VJ4G]. 
 45.  See, e.g., Legislation Denying Citizenship at Birth to Certain Children Born in 
the U.S., 19 Op. O.L.C. 340 (1995). 
 46.  See Ryan Bort, Fox News Immediately Pivots to Birthright Citizenship Mode, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
news/fox-news-birthright-citizenship-749844 [https://perma.cc/BG8E-B4A6] (“After 
Trump reignited the birthright debate Tuesday morning, the [Fox News] network gladly 
crammed its programming with talking heads defending it from every angle . . . .”); Emily 
Ekins, What Americans Think About Birthright Citizenship, CATO INST. (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/what-americans-think-about-birthright-citizenship [https:// 
perma.cc/6WAM-P7JN] (reporting November 2018 survey results finding that over 60 
percent of Republicans “oppose birthright citizenship for children born to mothers in 
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Many of the above-listed developments have the potential to make our 
constitutional system fairer and more rational by Levinson’s lights. Yet as 
this last example reflects, efforts to reshape the patterns and principles of 
governance can cut in the opposite direction. The fact of constitutional norm 
change is, in itself, normatively ambiguous.47 
Whether for good or for ill, all of this constitutional “unsettling” has 
been occurring outside the confines of Article V. Balkin is right that “the 
Constitution of Settlement can be changed . . . without a constitutional 
amendment, much less a new constitutional convention.”48 To varying 
degrees across different domains, such change is always already underway. 
C. Meanwhile, About That Constitution of Conversation 
At the same time that the Constitution of Settlement has become less 
settled, the Constitution of Conversation has become less, well, 
conversational. Partisan polarization and the rise of the conservative legal 
movement, among other factors, have helped to reshape—and bifurcate—
constitutional discourse. A wealth of qualitative evidence indicates that “[i]n 
addition to becoming more ideologically coherent and distinct, the parties 
have also become more constitutionally coherent and distinct over the past 
several decades.”49 Along the way, “Americans on both the left and the   
right . . . have come to view the Constitution not as an aspirational statement  
 
 
 
the country illegally”); Niels Lesniewski, Lindsey Graham Seconds Trump Proposal to 
End Birthright Citizenship, ROLL CALL (Oct. 30, 2018), https:// 
www.rollcall.com/news/politics/lindsey-graham-trump-birthright-citizenship [https:// 
perma.cc/DZ5Z-QUCQ] (“Sen. Lindsey Graham, a previous advocate of bipartisan 
immigration overhaul and who could be the chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the 
next Congress, is praising President Donald Trump’s effort to roll back birthright 
citizenship by executive fiat.”). 
 47.  See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1445–50 (2018); Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Normcore, DISSENT 
(Summer 2018), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/normcore-trump-resistance-
books-crisis-of-democracy [https://perma.cc/C669-SGVX]. 
 48.  Balkin, supra note 34, at 1164–65. On the general phenomenon of constitutional 
propositions moving over time from “off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall,” see JACK M. 
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 12, 61, 69–70, 88, 119, 177–83 (2011). 
 49.  Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 965 (2018). 
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of shared principles and a bulwark against tribalism, but as a cudgel with 
which to attack [political] enemies.”50 
Professor Julian Nyarko, Professor Eric Talley, and I recently enlisted 
computational methods to study the evolution of constitutional debate on 
the floor of Congress. On a variety of metrics, we found that Democratic and 
Republican members are now talking past each other in their constitutional 
rhetoric to a greater degree than ever before.51 The same is true of liberals 
and conservatives (identified as such by their voting behaviors).52 Since 
around 1980, it has become easier and easier for a machine-learning classifier 
to predict what sort of congressperson is speaking about the Constitution, 
based solely on the text of the remarks.53 
The “Constitution of Conversation” evokes an image of a public 
sphere in which divergent constitutional views are debated, amicably and 
openly, in pursuit of common judgments and common solutions. The 
discursive environment suggested by these findings, however, is more 
Schmittian than Habermasian.54 If Levinson arguably paints too grim a 
picture of the Constitution of Settlement, he may paint too rosy a picture of 
the Constitution of Conversation. Both of his metaphors seem increasingly 
inapt. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
Constitutional movements and zeitgeists are hard to pin down. The list 
of unsettling developments sketched in Part II might be challenged or 
qualified in any number of respects, perhaps most obviously on the ground  
that some of the examples appear unlikely to result in fundamental change.  
 
 
 50.  Amy Chua & Jed Rubenfeld, The Threat of Tribalism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/the-threat-of-tribalism/568342 
[https://perma.cc/JJ5G-446A]. 
 51.  See David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational Analysis 
of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 
27–38), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351339 [https://perma.cc/EZ8E-9TND]. 
 52.  Id. (manuscript at 31–32). 
 53.  Id. (manuscript at 29–36). 
 54.  Compare, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: 
REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 54–56 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., 1993) (outlining 
conditions for an “ideal speech situation”), with CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE 
POLITICAL 26–33 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press, expanded ed. 2007) (1932) 
(depicting politics as a life-and-death struggle between “friend” and “enemy”). 
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I hope others will refine and revise the list.  But if this Article’s overarching 
claim about the intensifying pressures being placed on the Constitution of 
Settlement is sound, it would seem to have significant implications for 
Levinson’s thesis and for the country. Let me close by suggesting a few. 
First, the distinction between the Constitution of Settlement and the 
Constitution of Conversation is more complicated—and fluid—than 
Levinson implies. On multiple occasions, Levinson has described himself as 
differentiating “sharply”55 or “very sharply”56 between the two. The norm-
bending behaviors cataloged above suffice to show that the current 
constitutional landscape is quite a bit fuzzier. 
Nor was there ever any sharp boundary here. As Professors Curtis 
Bradley and Neil Siegel have documented in detail, the perceived clarity and 
constraining force of any given piece of constitutional text are “constructed” 
to a significant degree by constitutional argumentation and other social 
practices.57 Those same practices can destabilize preexisting perceptions of 
clarity and constraint, just as they can stabilize such perceptions. Even if the 
words of a constitution never change, the mix of elements that are thought 
to be settled versus unsettled may vary over time. In any given period, some 
patterns of constitutional behavior and some propositions of constitutional 
law will be in the process of becoming more widely accepted and deeply 
entrenched—consider, for example, legal recognition of same-sex marriage 
in recent years—while other patterns and propositions will be in the process 
of becoming increasingly contested.58 
Responding to this point, Levinson suggests that the distinction 
between the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution                                
of Conversation is not meant to be interpretive or “linguistic[]” in nature but  
 
 
 55.  Sanford Levinson, On the Inevitability of “Constitutional Design,” 48 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 249, 250 (2016).  
 56.  Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia Is the Most Important Single 
Source of Insight on the Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 603, 609 n.20 (2018). 
 57.  See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the 
Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213 (2015).  
 58.  The title of this Article is therefore potentially misleading, in that the 
Constitution of Settlement is both shrinking and expanding. My primary focus here is on 
the shrinking side of the ledger. 
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rather “is relentlessly pragmatic.”59 This suggestion is belied, however, by  
Levinson’s persistent conflation of settledness with “clear and determinate”  
constitutional language.60 Semantic clarity in an authoritative legal text may 
well contribute to social settlement. But a relentlessly pragmatic approach 
would have to consider the possibility that certain textually unspecified 
institutions, such as same-sex marriage, are at this point significantly more 
settled than certain textually specified ones, such as the Electoral College. 
There may be a perverse irony to Levinson’s program, insofar as his fatalistic 
laments about the Constitution of Settlement reinforce perceptions of fixity 
and thereby make those lamented parts of our constitutional order that 
much more immune from creative (re)construction than they might 
otherwise be. Levinson, in other words, is not merely an external critic of the 
Constitution of Settlement but an active participant in its maintenance.  
Second, Levinson needs a theory of democracy to ground his critique 
of the Constitution of Settlement.61 He maintains that institutions such as the 
Senate and the Electoral College are fundamentally undemocratic and must 
be reformed for that reason. President Trump and his supporters deny the  
 
 
 
 59.  Sandy Levinson, Reply to Critics—Part Three: David Pozen on the Potential 
Malleability of the Constitution of Settlement, BALKINIZATION (June 9, 2019), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/06/reply-to-critics-part-three-david-pozen.html [https: 
//perma.cc/D6KZ-HTV9].  
 60.  LEVINSON, FRAMED, supra note 1, at 19; see, e.g., id. at 22 (identifying the 
Constitution of Settlement with “self-enforcing provisions” that have a “clear 
meaning”); id. at 23 (identifying the Constitution of Settlement with “clear constitutional 
commands”). 
 61.  His critique might also be deepened by greater attention to comparative 
constitutional development and design. Cf. David Schleicher, Things Aren’t Going That 
Well over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective, 
2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433, 435–38 (arguing that the United States’ recent governance 
problems have been “driven by changes in the amount and type of radical opinion” 
common across Western democracies and that “it will prove difficult to use the tools of 
institutional design to make democracy work well when a substantial part of the 
population would rather hold out for fundamental change”); Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Another Rendezvous with Destiny, BALKINIZATION (May 7, 2019), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/05/another-rendezvous-with-destiny.html [https:// 
perma.cc/YE82-5ZAQ] (“If the United States is just one of many dysfunctional 
democracies, then that suggests that [Levinson’s] focus on the hard-wired provisions of 
our Constitution as the source of our problems is incorrect. Other national constitutions 
with very different provisions are faring no better.”). 
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premise. They are apt to extol the “genius”62 of these institutions and to 
assail birthright citizenship as an “undemocratic”63 “scam.”64 
I agree with Levinson on these matters and disagree with President 
Trump. But appeals to “democracy,” or to subsidiary principles such as 
majority rule or one person one vote,65 will not tell us which elements in our 
constitutional system deserve to be celebrated and which deserve to be 
overhauled without an account of democracy’s purposes, preconditions, and 
normative priority. Different conceptions of democracy may point toward 
different problems and solutions.  
Third, Levinson needs a theory of popular sovereignty or collective will 
formation to ground his call for a new constitutional convention.66 Even if 
Levinson is correct that the Constitution of Settlement is undemocratic, it 
does not necessarily follow that an Article V convention (or any other sort 
of convention) is the best method for remedying its defects. In practice, a 
convention might lead to an even worse Constitution. As Professor David 
Super has emphasized, much depends on how a convention is organized and  
 
 
 62.  See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2016, 7:40 
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/798521053551140864?lang=en [https:// 
perma.cc/5RDX-SN89] (“The Electoral College is actually genius in that it brings all 
states, including the smaller ones, into play.”). 
 63.  See, e.g., Michael Anton, Trump Should End Birthright Citizenship. It Shouldn’t 
Have Existed in the First Place., USA TODAY (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/01/framers-never-wanted-birthright-
citizenship/1831577002 [https://perma.cc/U475-DJUH] (“There is nothing in the 
Constitution or in statute law that gives the federal government authority to grant 
citizenship to people not entitled to it. Federal agencies simply do it . . . . It’s one of 
thousands of examples of our runaway, undemocratic, unelected bureaucracy acting in 
concert with liberal interests.”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Tucker Carlson, Tucker Carlson: Birthright Citizenship Is a Scam. 
There Is No Other Word for It, FOX NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-birthright-citizenship-is-a-scam-there-
is-no-other-word-for-it [https://perma.cc/P6PZ-XR7E] (“This is a scam. There is no 
other word for it.”). 
 65.  On some of the persistent conceptual and empirical ambiguities of the one-
person-one-vote norm, see generally Nathaniel Persily, Who Counts for One Person, 
One Vote?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1395 (2017). 
 66.  Arguably, Levinson also needs a theory of constitutionalism to justify his 
support for revising the canonical document rather than scrapping it altogether or 
“systematically ignor[ing]” its commands. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 5 (2012). 
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run,67 matters to which progressives such as Levinson have thus far devoted  
little attention. In principle, it is not entirely clear why a constitutional  
convention should enjoy greater democratic or moral legitimacy than the 
more diffuse and informal processes of constitutional reform that are 
happening all around us. Levinson never explores, for example, whether and 
under what conditions a convention would be more or less likely than 
ordinary politics to generate inclusive forms of representation or creative 
coalition building.  
What’s so special, in short, about a constitutional convention? Unless 
Levinson can offer a good nonconsequentialist answer—and one may be 
available68—why shouldn’t those who are troubled by the constitutional 
status quo simply make a practical political judgment about where their 
reform efforts are likely to have the greatest impact? That calculus, 
presumably, will often point them away from Article V. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A final implication of the unsettling of the Constitution of Settlement 
should concern us all: It raises the stakes of electoral politics. Those stakes 
are high, of course, even in periods of relative constitutional quiescence. In 
a period when previously taken-for-granted constitutional institutions and 
distributions are increasingly subject to revision through subconstitutional 
means, they are higher still. More first principles of governance are up for 
grabs. 
This observation is alarming but also invigorating. Counterpoised 
against President Trump’s own reactionary reform agenda, the rapid 
mainstreaming of proposals to end partisan gerrymandering, nationalize the 
presidential vote, rein in the Supreme Court, and grant statehood to the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico strike me as hopeful developments. 
 
 67.  See David A. Super, The Hidden Threat to Our Constitution, ACS EXPERT F. 
(June 19, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-hidden-threat-to-our-
constitution [https://perma.cc/E7BH-DSUA]. 
 68.  Cf. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of 
Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.J. 664, 681 (2018) (book review) (explaining that 
constitutional lawmaking through popular “authorship, revision, or reaffirmation,” as in 
a referendum or special convention, was regarded in the Founding Era “as the sole 
possible form of democratic self-rule in the large and complex societies of political 
modernity”). Levinson and I share the view that Grewal and Britton-Purdy’s recovery 
of this strand of Founding-Era thought poses a powerful challenge for contemporary 
constitutional theory. 
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“Fundamental political and constitutional reform is now a realistic 
possibility”69 to a degree that seemed implausible even five years ago. 
Levinson’s conceit of a Constitution of Settlement underscores just how  
transformative—how reconstitutive of our democracy—these sorts of 
structural changes could be. His contempt for that Constitution underscores 
just how overdue they are. 
 
 69.  Stephen Griffin, On Democracy and Dysfunction, BALKINIZATION (May 14, 
2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/05/on-democracy-and-dysfunction.html [https:// 
perma.cc/G3FN-HLQ9]. 
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